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ABSTRACT
We analyze two experiments that provided direct information on school test scores to lower-income
families in a public school choice plan. We find that receiving information significantly increases the
fraction of parents choosing higher-performing schools. Parents with high-scoring alternatives nearby
were more likely to choose non-guaranteed schools with higher test scores. Using random variation
from each experiment, we find evidence that attending a higher-scoring school increases student test
scores. The results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for
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I. Introduction  
 
Several urban public school districts are currently experimenting with public school choice 
plans, and the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001 includes a choice provision 
allowing students in failing schools to choose to attend non-failing schools outside of their 
neighborhood. The goal of these choice plans is to increase academic outcomes for 
disadvantaged students by allowing them to attend higher-performing schools and by creating 
pressure on failing schools to improve through the threat of losing students, implicitly assuming 
that parents select schools for academics when offered the opportunity to do so. However, recent 
work on parental choice has found that low-income families place much less weight on 
academics when choosing schools, decreasing the immediate academic gains for those exercising 
choice (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2007), as well as the pressure for low-performing schools to 
improve academic achievement (Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006).
1 
 
It may be the case that, all else equal, low-income families place lower weights on school test 
scores because they rationally expect lower returns to education for their children. Alternatively, 
these families may place a high value on academic outcomes but find it more costly to act on 
those preferences, leading to lower expressed preferences for academic achievement. Several 
recent papers have explored how salience and cognitive costs affect consumer decisions in a 
wide-range of markets, including retail purchases, Medicare plans, credit cards, and retirement 
investments (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft [2007], Kling et al. [2008], Ausubel [1991], Hastings 
and Tejeda-Ashton [2008], respectively). If lower-income families face higher costs of gathering 
and interpreting statistics on academic achievement, they may choose schools based on easier-to-
determine characteristics such as proximity, instead of school test scores.  
 
                                                 
1 In addition to these papers, Schneider and Buckley (2002) monitored the search behavior of parents on an Internet 
web site for public schools in Washington, DC, and show that academics are more important search criteria for 
college-educated parents. Fossey (1994) and Armor and Peiser (1998) studied the characteristics of school districts’ 
gaining and losing students in a Massachusetts interdistrict choice program and find that non-minority students and 
students with high-test scores were more likely to change districts. On the other hand, Jacob and Lefgren (2007) 
examined parental choices of individual teachers within schools and find that higher-poverty and minority parents 
are less likely to actively select a teacher, but conditional on choosing a teacher, parents in higher-poverty and 
minority schools place more emphasis on measures of teachers’ ability to raise achievement, rather than student 
satisfaction. 
   3
If this is the case, policy interventions that reduce the cost of acquiring and analyzing 
comparative information on school academic achievement may result in more parents choosing 
higher-performing schools within a public school choice plan.
2 This paper uses a natural 
experiment and a field experiment in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Public School District (CMS) to 
examine the degree to which transparent and easily accessible information on school-level 
academic performance impacts the schools that parents choose for their children, the importance 
they place on academic achievement when choosing schools, and the impact that attending 
higher-performing schools has on subsequent student outcomes.  
 
Each spring since 2002 parents in CMS could submit their top three school choices for their 
children for the next school year. In order to find information on schools, they could reference a 
100-plus-page school choice guide with self-descriptions of the positive aspects of each school. 
However, to access objective statistics on student achievement, parents would have to search the 
CMS website and make a comparison school by school. In the summer of 2004, after the annual 
school choice process had been completed, CMS re-sent choice forms along with a three-page 
spreadsheet printout of test scores at every school in the district (sorted alphabetically by name) 
to each family with a child enrolled at an NCLB-sanctioned school in order to comply with 
NCLB regulation.
3 We use this implementation of NCLB as a natural experiment, comparing the 
choices parents made in the spring with no direct test score information to the choices they made 
in the summer with the NCLB-mandated test score information, to estimate the impact of 
information on parents’ school choices. 
  
We then analyze data from a field experiment we conducted during the 2006-2007 school choice 
process. Working with CMS, we provided information sheets with the school choice forms to 
parents with children in randomly selected schools serving primarily low- to middle-income 
neighborhoods.
4 The sheets provided either clear statistics on academic achievement for each 
school in the child’s choice set or information on academic achievement coupled with estimated 
                                                 
2 Making information more salient can be represented as lowering decision-making costs in the terminology of 
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2007). 
3 This was the first year that any school could be categorized as “Title I improving” under NCLB in CMS. Each 
state completed a Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook for NCLB, and states may have varied 
in the specifics of how they would implement the broad goals of the regulation. In Section III we will outline how 
Title I status and AYP are determined in the state of North Carolina and in CMS. 
4 We will discuss restrictions placed on the field experiment by CMS in Section IV.   4
odds of admission. The information presented was simpler than the NCLB-mandated information 
in that it appeared in a one-page format, was sorted by the academic ranking of schools (instead 
of alphabetically), and contained only information on the schools relevant for the child’s choice 
(e.g., only elementary schools for elementary school children). The simplified information was 
given to students at unsanctioned schools, where the control group received no direct information 
on test score performance, as well as at NCLB-sanctioned schools where the control group 
received the NCLB-mandated three-page spreadsheet. This allows us to estimate the impact that 
the simpler one-page format had over no direct information, as well as the added impact it had 
over the NCLB-mandated information. 
 
In both of these experimental settings, we find that providing parents with direct information on 
school test scores resulted in significantly more parents choosing higher scoring schools for their 
children. Both the three-page NCLB-mandated information and our one-page information format 
increased the proportion of parents choosing non-guaranteed schools by 5 to 7 percentage points 
and increased the average test score of schools chosen by 0.05 to 0.10 student-level standard 
deviations, relative to the control group that received no direct information on test scores. We do 
not find evidence that our simpler one-page format had substantial added impact over the NCLB 
format, suggesting that gains from simplified information flatten out eventually.  
 
The overall impact of receiving information on the test score of the school chosen represents the 
average impact of receiving information across parents who still chose their guaranteed school 
(zero impact) and parents who selected schools with significantly higher test scores. For 
example, the 16% of parents who responded to NCLB-mandated information in 2004 by 
choosing an alternative school chose schools with 0.5 student-level standard deviations higher 
test scores than the schools they had chosen in the spring. In both settings, we find that a key 
predictor of both responding to information by choosing an alternative school and the test score 
of the school chosen is proximity to high-scoring school alternatives. This is consistent with a 
model where parents choose schools to maximize utility, which is increasing in expected 
academic achievement but decreasing in time and travel costs, and implies that, even with 
transparent information, school choice can only be as effective as the options offered to parents.  
   5
Next, we examine if an increase in the test scores of the schools parents chose led to 
improvements in their children’s own academic performance. We use instrumental variables 
approaches, exploiting random variation generated by each experiment in the test score of the 
school attended to estimate the impact of attending a higher-scoring school on student academic 
outcomes. In both experiments, we find large but marginally significant impacts of the test score 
of the school attended on own test scores. The point estimates imply gains in own test scores of 
0.37 - 0.41 student-level standard deviations from attending a school with a one standard 
deviation higher average test score. We compare our findings to those from prior studies that 
have examined the impact on own achievement of attending a school with higher average test 
scores in the context of choice without simplified information (Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt 2006; 
Cullen and Jacob 2007; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2007) and in the context of student 
assignment without choice (Hoxby and Weingarth-Salyer 2005; Hastings and Weinstein 2008).  
 
II. Background Description of the CMS School Choice Plan  
 
Before the introduction of a school choice plan in the fall of 2002, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Public School District (CMS) operated under a racial desegregation order for three decades. For 
the 2002-2003 school year, CMS moved to a district-wide school choice plan in response to a 
court order to cease busing for racial integration. In the spring of 2002, parents were asked to 
submit their top three choices of school programs for each child. Each student was assigned a 
“home school” in her neighborhood. This school was typically one of the closest schools to her, 
and she was guaranteed admission to this school. Admission to non-guaranteed schools was 
granted based on a lottery. In the initial implementation of the school choice program, CMS 
underwent a large redistricting of home school assignments; approximately 50% of parcels lost 
property rights to the school they had rights to under busing.  
 
In the first year of choice, the district required every parent to submit a choice form, and it 
achieved a 95% compliance rate. In each year after the initial choice year, only parents of 
students in rising grades (K, 6
th, 9
th), new students to the district, students affected by the 
opening of new schools, and parents who wished to change their children’s school were required 
to submit choice forms. Each year a significant fraction of schools in the district is   6
oversubscribed.
5 The lottery process for assigning students to oversubscribed schools has 
continued since the introduction of school choice in 2002. Under the lottery system, students are 
first assigned to priority groups by school and grade. The priority groups have varied from year 
to year but generally have given priority to higher-poverty and lower-performing students who 
choose lower-poverty and higher-performing schools.
6 Within each priority group, admission is 
determined by randomly assigned lottery number alone. 
 
In order for parents to determine which schools to choose, CMS provided several resources. 
First, each year CMS produced a school choice guide that was approximately 100 pages long. It 
contained detailed instructions on how to complete the school choice form and how to submit it, 
along with a brief description of the lottery process.
7 The bulk of the choice book was devoted to 
written descriptions of each school and program, from pre-school through high school. There are 
approximately 120 elementary, 40 middle, and 30 high school choice options in the district. The 
descriptions were written by the schools, describing the positive features each school offered to 
students. Objective measures of school characteristics, such as average test score performance, 
suspension rates, or racial compositions, were not included. 
 
In addition, CMS provided a Family Application Center that parents could phone or visit in order 
to ask questions about the school choice process. The staff members at the Family Application 
Center emphasized the positive aspects of each school during their discussions with parents. In 
particular, staff members were supposed to respond to questions like “Which school is the best 
school?” by advising parents to discuss with their children what their needs were and then to visit 
the different school options in order to determine which school was the best for their children, 
since what a “good” school is depends on each individual child.
8 It is important to note that this 
                                                 
5 In the first year, approximately one third of the schools were oversubscribed due to CMS’s commitment to expand 
capacities at schools in an effort to give parents one of their three choices. In subsequent years, two thirds of the 
schools have been oversubscribed as capacities were fixed. 
6 The priority group definitions were initially based on free- and reduced-lunch status and the concentration of free- 
and reduced-lunch recipients at a school. Since the use of lunch recipient status has recently received negative 
attention, CMS moved to use test score performance as a priority instead. Students performing below average on end 
of year exams are given priority for admission to schools performing at or above the district average on standardized 
exams.    
7 Parents were not told how the lottery was run (e.g., first-choice maximizer) or how the “priority boosts” were 
implemented. 
8 Information from interviews and conversations with Family Application Center staff.    7
advice may be correct, as the relationship between school average test scores and student 
achievement has not been strongly established. However, it suggests to parents that identifying a 
“good” school takes a substantial and potentially daunting investment of time and effort.   
 
CMS also offers an extensive website. On this website, parents can review objective statistics for 
each school. Individual “school profile” pages provide statistics, such as physical locations, 
standardized test score performance, suspension rates, racial compositions, and attendance rates. 
Parents would have to view statistics for each school separately; hence, obtaining objective 
information on schools might involve a significant web search and comparison.  
  
On top of this information regime, two exogenous changes in information on school test scores 
were introduced: NCLB-mandated information in 2004 and our field experiment in 2006. 
Begining in 2004, families with children at NCLB-sanctioned schools were provided with 
NCLB-mandated information, which consisted of a three-page, alphabetically sorted printout of 
test score performance for every school in CMS (regardless of grade level). Our experiment in 
2006 provided a one-page table of test scores, sorted by score, for only relevant choice options to 
students at both NCLB-sanctioned and unsanctioned schools. Figure I presents a timeline of 
events for reference throughout the discussion of the two experiments and empirical results. It is 
important to note that both experiments exclude the highest-income families in CMS; this is by 
definition in the case of NCLB and by stipulation in the case of our field experiment.
9 Table I 
gives average characteristics of each experimental group, relative to the district-wide average. 
While families in both experiments are more likely to be African American, receive lunch 
subsidies, and have children with lower average test scores, these families are representative of 
families that many school choice plans, and NCLB in particular, are intended to help. 
 
III. NCLB – A Natural Experiment in Transparent Information on Academics 
 
Beginning in the summer of 2004, CMS began the first phase of sanctions for Title I schools that 
failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for two years in a row. As defined by CMS, a 
school is a Title I school (receives federal Title I funds) if 75% or more of its students qualify for 
                                                 
9 We will discuss the design of the field experiment in detail in Section IV.    8
federal lunch subsidies. As defined by North Carolina under NCLB compliance, a school needs 
to satisfy certain academic targets for ten subgroups of students in order to make AYP.
10 If just 
one target was missed for one subgroup, then the school failed to make AYP. Thus if a school is 
both Title 1 for two years in a row and also fails to make AYP for two years in a row it is 
classified as Title 1 Improving and thus subject to NCLB regulation.
11 
 
Sixteen schools satisfied both constraints in 2004 and entered into regulation under NCLB. The 
regulation mandated that parents be notified of the NCLB status of their school and offered the 
choice to attend an alternative school. In addition, parents had to be given information on the 
academic achievement at the schools they could select.
12 CMS provided a three-page spreadsheet 
printout, sorted by school name, with the percent proficient for every school in the district, as 
well as a list of Title I Improving schools, since students exercising choice under NCLB are not 
allowed to choose another Title I Improving school. Thus, the NCLB legislation provided clear 
statistics to parents on the academic achievement at their school and at every other school in the 
district, as well as notification that their school had failed to meet AYP.
13 For families with 
children at these schools, we observe the choices they submitted in the Spring 2004 choice plan 
with no direct information on school test scores and the choices they submitted in July 2004 after 
receiving the NCLB-mandated test score information. Students of parents who chose alternative 
schools in July were then entered into a school choice lottery.  
 
Parents were told, just like in the regular spring lottery, that if they wanted to remain at their 
current school, they did not have to fill out a form. Of 6,695 students in our sample who received 
                                                 
10 For a list of subgroups and detailed description of AYP targets and requirements, please see the Consolidated 
State Application Accountability Workbook for North Carolina (2005), which provides federal NCLB guidelines 
along with North Carolina’s implementation of these guidelines. 
11 Schools that satisfied either the Title I requirement or the AYP requirement, but not both, were not subject to 
regulation under NCLB. For example, thirteen schools were Title I in both the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school 
years but made AYP in at least one of those years and hence were not subject to regulation under NCLB. Similarly, 
21 schools did not make AYP in either of the two school years but were not Title I and thus were  not subject to 
regulation under NCLB.  
12 United States Department of Education, Public School Choice. (Washington, DC: United States Department of 
Education, 2004). Available at www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/schoolchoiceguid.pdf. p. 18. 
13 Importantly, this information is only provided to parents of students slated to attend a NCLB school in the 
subsequent school year.    9
NCLB notification, 1,149 responded by submitting a form in July.
14 Of the parents who did fill 
out a form in July, 57 of them listed their current NCLB school as their first choice, which they 
did not need to do in order to remain at their NCLB school. Thus, 1,092 parents filled out a form 
in July and chose a school different than their current NCLB school. 
 
Given the number of responders alone, it appears that NCLB notification had a significant 
impact on parental choice. Table II presents mean choice behavior for parents at NCLB schools 
before and after receiving NCLB-mandated information. If we include all parents (those that 
chose their NCLB school in the spring choice round and those that did not), we see that, after 
receiving NCLB information, the fraction of parents that chose an alternative school increased by 
5.1 percentage points relative to a base of 11%. The average test score of the school chosen 
increased by a statistically significant 0.047 student-level standard deviations. If we consider 
only parents who chose their NCLB school first in the spring, the fraction of parents choosing an 
alternative school increased from 0% to 14.5%. The average test score of the school chosen 
increased by 0.088 student-level standard deviations.  
 
The average difference in the test score at the chosen school between the spring and the summer 
implies that parents who submitted forms in the summer chose schools with much higher average 
test scores. Figure II shows a kernel density estimate of the difference in the test score of the 
first-choice school in July and the NCLB school for parents who did not choose the NCLB 
school first in July. On average, responders selected first-choice schools with 0.62 student-level 
standard deviation higher test scores than the NCLB school. A small fraction of parents chose 
schools that were close to or slightly worse performing than the NCLB school, while another 
minority of parents chose some of the highest-performing schools in the district; schools that 
outperformed the NCLB school by over one student-level standard deviation in test score. 
 
Rows 1 and 2 of Table III show the average test score at the first-choice school in the spring 
versus in July for parents who chose an alternative school in July. They indicate a 0.485 (-0.017 
                                                 
14 We began with the 8,284 students who received NCLB notification, of which 1,363 responded by filling out a 
form in July.  We exclude from the analysis students who were not active in CMS at the time of the spring lottery 
(221 students), students with special needs or those being retained (1,245 additional students), and students who had 
missing demographic information (123 additional students).   10
versus -0.502) student-level standard deviation increase in the average test score of the school 
chosen after receiving the NCLB-mandated information. This change in choice behavior was not 
mechanically generated by the fact that NCLB parents could not select another NCLB school in 
July. Rows 3 and 4 demonstrate this point. These rows show that the average test scores of 
available schools within five miles only increased by 0.075 (-0.247 versus -0.322) student-level 
standard deviations by excluding other NCLB schools from the choice set. Hence if parents 
chose schools at random from the set of schools within five miles in the spring and in july, we 
would expect only a 0.075 increase in average score of the school chosen. Hence almost all of 
the gain in the average test score of the chosen school came from a change in choice behavior.  
 
Table IV examines which types of parents were more likely to respond to NCLB-mandated 
information by choosing an alternative school, and of those parents, which ones were more likely 
to choose higher-scoring schools. Suppose that, once a parent is fully informed about the 
academic performance at each choice option, they select a school to maximize utility which is 
increasing in expected academic achievement but decreasing in commuting costs to schools. 
Simplified information on test scores may lower information costs, increasing the implicit weight 
parents place on academics when choosing a school. However, parents may still face trade-offs 
from time and transportation costs that censor the impact of information on observed choice 
behavior. We might expect to see the largest impact of information on parental choice where 
these other costs of choosing a school are lowest, for example, where there are proximate high-
scoring school alternatives.  
 
Table IV presents regressions of the form:  
     i i i i R X y ε δ β α + + + =
' '  (1) 
where  yi is an indicator for whether the parent chose an alternative to their NCLB school 
(columns (1) and (2)) or the average test score at the first-choice school conditional on having 
chosen an alternative school in July (columns (3) and (4)), Xi is a vector of student 
characteristics, Ri are NCLB school and program fixed effects, and  i ε  is a random error term that 
allows for clustering at the NCLB school-program and grade level. Columns (1) and (3) present 
results for the entire sample, while columns (2) and (4) present results for the sub-sample of 
families who chose their NCLB school in the spring.    11
 
The results imply that proximity to high-scoring schools with one student-level standard 
deviation higher test scores increases the probability of responding to information by choosing 
an alternative school by 9.1 – 11.0 percentage points (columns (1) and (2)). Columns (3) and (4) 
show that, conditional on choosing an alternative school, parents with higher-scoring schools 
within five miles choose significantly higher-scoring alternatives (0.186 – 0.233 student-level 
standard deviation increase). Although the average score of and distance to schools within five 
miles are relatively ad hoc measures of choice set characteristics, they do have the impact on 
choice behavior we would expect to see if parental choice response to simplified information 
were constrained by factors that affect the cost of choosing high-performing schools.  
 
In addition to choice set characteristics, demographic characteristics are also significant 
determinants of the response to information. Both parents with a single child in CMS and parents 
of rising-grade children were more likely to choose out in July; however, conditional on 
choosing out, they did not choose significantly higher-scoring schools.
15 This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that these characteristics may lower the costs of choosing an alternative school, 
but they may not be associated with a higher implicit value for academic achievement. African 
American parents were more likely to choose out in July; however, conditional on choosing out, 
both African Americans and parents of free-and-reduced lunch recipients selected significantly 
lower performing schools.
16 Interestingly, both high-scoring students and those with past 
suspensions were more likely to choose out in July. While high- and low-performing students 
sought to attend alternative schools, conditional on choosing out, test scores and suspension rates 
had no significant effect on the test score of the school chosen. Unexcused absences, on the other 
hand, decrease significantly the probability of choosing out, as well as the test score of the school 
chosen, although the magnitudes of the coefficients are small. As we might expect, the 
regression results in columns (1) and (3) also show that parents who chose out in the spring were 
                                                 
15 We define a student as a single child if there are no other children registered in CMS with the same last name and 
street address. While this may not capture all siblings, it at least captures those for whom schooling decisions are 
made from the same residential address and within the same family unit. It is also the definition used by CMS when 
defining sibling status. Rising grade students are those who going into Kindergarten, 6
th, or 9
th grade and will 
therefore be changing school locations for the next school year as they transition to the next education level. 
16 This may reflect the trade-off between school average test score and fraction minority that African American 
parents face when choosing a school. However, it is important in interpreting these results to remember that this 
sample of students is almost 90% lunch subsidy recipients and over 77% African American.   12
also significantly more likely to choose out in July and, conditional on choosing out, selected 
higher-scoring schools.   
 
Overall, the NCLB-mandated information facilitated the choice of a higher-performing 
alternative school for a significant fraction of parents. Importantly, we find that proximity to 
high-performing schools is a key factor in determining the probability of responding to 
information by choosing an alternative, higher-scoring school. 
 
IV. A Field Experiment in the 2006-2007 School Choice Plan 
 
Working with CMS, we designed simplified information sheets to attach to parents’ school 
choice forms for the 2006-2007 school choice round to test if simplified information has a 
similar effect on parental choice outside of the NCLB sub-population and also if moving to a 
simpler one-page format has an added impact over the three-page NCLB-mandated test score 
information. The field experiment was limited by the district in several important ways. First, 
students attending the same school and living in the same choice zone had to receive the same 
type of information. Hence, information was randomized at the school and choice-zone level 
(school-zone).
17 Second, the set of schools was restricted to NCLB schools and non-NCLB 
schools serving low- to middle-income neighborhoods, and we were asked to limit the number of 
forms provided to non-NCLB students to a few thousand. As in prior years, choice forms were 
provided to all students slated to attend NCLB schools (to comply with the choice requirements 
of the law), to rising grade students (going into Kindergarten, 6
th, or 9
th grade in the next school 
year), and to students whose home-school assignments for the 2006-2007 school year were 
affected by the opening of new schools. Our simplified information sheet was attached to this 
choice form, so grade restrictions held as well.  
 
                                                 
17 The district was split into 4 quadrants called “choice zones”. Parents could choose from any school in the district, 
but their child would only receive free transportation to schools in their choice zone. For the 2006-2007 school year, 
CMS significantly redrew the boundaries of the choice zones so that each zone contained a range of possible schools 
given the new restricted choice set. Hence, it was often the case that students attending the same current school lived 
in different 2006-2007 choice zones, even though they would have been in the same choice zone under the prior 
choice zone boundary definition. In addition the randomization was done separately for school-zones in 11 
randomization blocks created from high-school feeder zones to make sure that treatments were geographically 
spread since we had relatively few observations to randomize over.   13
In addition, we were restricted to providing information on test scores and odds of admission. 
After the first year of school choice, a significant number of schools in the district were over-
subscribed, admitting few, if any, students each year. Despite this fact, demand for these schools 
did not decline.
18 We combined odds of admission with test scores to examine how, if at all, 
parents would react to clear information on admit chance. We randomly selected school-zones to 
receive either Score forms (test score information only) or Odds forms (test scores coupled with 
odds of admission) subject to the constraints listed above. The randomization was done 
separately for each of the segments of schools: pre-K (rising kindergarten), 5
th graders (rising 
6
th), 8
th graders (rising 9
th), and NCLB students. There were 6,328 non-NCLB students in 46 
school-zones (39 schools) who were part of the field experiment, and 10,134 NCLB students in 
31 school-zones (19 schools).
19  
 
The simplified information forms were specialized for each child. They contained a list of 
schools in the student’s choice set, which depended on the student’s choice zone and her home 
school assignment for the 2006-2007 school year. Figures III and IV provide examples of the 
simplified information forms. The forms list the schools in the choice set, along with program-
specific school average scores (and odds of admission where applicable).
20 The scores were 
calculated from the prior year’s average performance of students in that school and program on 
standardized tests and then re-scaled to correspond to a percentage score that looks like a grade.
21 
                                                 
18 This led the district to limit the available schools for choice in the 2006-2007 school choice plan to those with a 
positive probability of admitting students, in order to mitigate parental discontent. Despite the change in the schools 
offered for choice, there were many school options with a wide range of academic performance for families to 
choose from. For further discussion of the 2006-2007 school choice plan, what information the district provided on 
school capacity constraints, as well as summary statistics on the 2006-2007 school choice offerings, please see 
Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007). 
19 Note that the number of NCLB schools increased since 2004; however, they were all still elementary and middle 
schools. There were nineteen NCLB schools expected for the 2006-2007 school year. After the 2006 test score 
results were completed in July 2006, two more schools ended up being classified as Title I Improving, resulting in 
21 total NCLB schools for the 2006-2007 school year. 
20 Two types of each form were given: one with only numeric information on test scores and one with a graphical 
apple rating that represented the numeric scores in addition to the numbers themselves. The graphical addition was 
randomized within school and homeroom, since it technically added no new information. We did not find that 
further simplification affected choices, so we pool the choice forms with and without graphics for this analysis.  
21 The schools in each information table were sorted by test score. The guaranteed school option for each child was 
presented separately in its own line below the test score table. This was done to facilitate personalizing the 
information sheets for each child and to match the way the choices were listed on the actual choice form. Typically, 
the guaranteed choice was open to lottery choices, so it would be listed in test-score-order within the table as well. 
However, in some instances where the guaranteed choice was not open for students to choose in, it only appeared as 
a separate line below the choice table. This was the case, for example, in Figure IV but not in Figure III.    14
The odds of admission were calculated based on the prior year’s admission rates. The 
information sheets incorporated the CMS logo and its graphic themes and were designed to look 
as if they were made by and came from the school district. The school district approved the final 
design. The staff at the Family Application Center reported seeing parents with their simplified 
information sheets in hand, with notes written on the forms as they made their decisions. 
 
Tables V and VI examine the effect that simplified information had on aggregate choice 
behavior. The outcome measures of interest are aggregated or averaged at the school-zone level, 
that is, the level at which the treatment was assigned. Table V shows that average baseline 
characteristics are balanced across treatment and control groups. The first three columns give the 
means of the dependent variables (baseline characteristics) for the treatment and control groups. 
The last two columns give the coefficient from a regression of each dependent variable on 
whether the school-zone received Score or Odds forms, controlling for randomization-block 
fixed effects:
22  
S S S S S R T T y ε δ φ θ α + + + + =
' 2 1  (2) 
where TS
1 and TS
2 are indicators for whether students in school-zone S received the Score form 
or the Odds form, respectively, and RS are randomization-block fixed effects. All of the 
coefficients are insignificant, implying that baseline characteristics are balanced across treatment 
and control groups. 
 
Table VI presents regression results from specification (2), where the dependent variables are the  
fraction of parents listing a non-guaranteed school as their first choice and the average difference 
between the test score of the first-choice school and the test score at the guaranteed school (test 
score gain). Panel 1 presents results pooled across non-NCLB and NCLB school-zones. Panels 2 
and 3 present results separately for non-NCLB and NCLB school-zones, respectively, since the 
information available to the control groups differs across those two samples. Within each panel, 
the first two rows report the treatment effect of receiving a Score form or an Odds form, while 
the third row presents the pooled treatment effect of receiving either type of form. Columns (1) 
and (2) provide ordinary least squares estimates, while columns (3) and (4) provide weighted 
                                                 
22 Because the randomization was done separately within the different grade levels for non-NCLB schools and 
zones, and since class sizes vary across these zones, we control for randomization-block fixed effects (Rouse 1998).   15
least squares estimates, where each school-zone observation is weighted by the number of 
students in that school-zone.  
 
The first panel of estimates shows no significant overall impact of transparent information on 
parental choice behavior pooled across the non-NCLB and NCLB observations. However, the 
second panel shows that among the non-NCLB school-zones, where the control group received 
no direct information on test scores, information had a significant impact on choices. Receiving 
information on test scores increased the fraction of parents who chose a non-guaranteed school 
by about 7 percentage points, off of a base of 31%. This implies that simplified information on 
test scores increased demand for non-guaranteed schools by an economically significant 23%. 
Receiving information on odds of admission and test scores did not have a significant impact on 
the fraction of parents choosing non-guaranteed schools, although the point estimates are similar 
in magnitude to the point estimates on Score form.
23 Both forms have similar effects on the 
average difference between the test score of the first-choice school and the test score at the 
guaranteed school; Score forms and Odds forms caused an increase of about 0.10 student-level 
standard deviations (a 70% increase relative to the mean of 0.14). If we pool the receipt of a 
Scores or an Odds form into one indicator for received information, the overall impact on 
parental choice is similar and slightly more significant. Hence, in the non-NCLB group, parents 
respond to information by choosing alternative schools with significantly higher test scores.  
 
These results are similar in magnitude to the results in Table II from the 2004 NCLB natural 
experiment. This suggests that our information may have no additional effect over the NCLB-
mandated information. Indeed, the third panel of results in Table VI presents estimates of the 
effects on aggregate choice behavior in the NCLB sample of school-zones. Here the control 
group received the three-page NCLB-mandated information; insignificant results imply that our 
simplified information had no effect above and beyond the NCLB-mandated information. This 
suggests that the impact of providing easy-to-access and transparent information flattens out 
                                                 
23 Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007) find that simplified information on test scores also affected the 
average number of choices that parents listed. School-zones receiving Score forms had a significant 24% increase in 
the average number of choices listed, relative to the control group. However, school-zones receiving Odds forms had 
no significant average increase in the number of choices listed relative to the control group. This implies that 
knowing the odds of admission along with the test score of each choice decreased the number of choices listed 
relative to receiving information on test scores alone.   16
eventually, and most of the effect on choices may come from providing clear statistics at the time 
of choice, rather than the exact format those statistics appear in.
24 
 
As in the 2004 NCLB natural experiment, we can use student-level data to examine which 
families were more likely to respond to our information sheets by choosing substantially better 
schools. Figure V shows a kernel density estimate, by treatment and control groups, of the test 
score of the school chosen relative to the guaranteed school for parents who chose alternative 
schools. Because mean impacts of scores and odds were similar, we combine the treatments into 
“Received_Information” and plot the choices of those families versus the choices of control 
group families. There are two interesting things to note. First, receiving information almost 
eliminates the density of parents who pick schools with lower average test scores than their 
guaranteed option (density to the left of zero). Second, receiving information more than doubles 
the density of parents choosing schools with average test scores more than one student-level 
standard deviation higher than their children’s guaranteed school. This gain represents moving 
from a school in the lower quartile of the distribution of test scores across schools to one in the 
upper quartile. 
 
Table VII presents results for the non-NCLB sample from regressions of the form: 
i i i i i i i R X Z T T y ε δ β λ θ α + + + + + =
' ' '  (3) 
where Xi is a vector of student characteristics such as race and lunch recipient status, as well as 
characteristics of the student’s choice set that might affect her choices, such as the average test 
score at local schools and the average distance to local schools. The Ri are randomization-block 
fixed effects. We combine the forms into one treatment for “received information”, Ti, which is 
an indicator for whether the child received a Score form or an Odds form, and ZiTi is a vector of 
interactions between baseline characteristics and the treatment indicator. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school-zone and grade level. 
 
Column (1) shows the interaction effects of receiving information on the gain in the score of the 
first-choice school relative to the guaranteed school, and column (2) shows the same regression 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, it may be the case that this group of parents is relatively inert. Parents who would have responded 
to NCLB information and notification may have already responded by choosing out in prior years. Hence the 
remaining students have parents who are not responsive to information on academic outcomes.   17
restricted to the sample of students that chose a non-guaranteed school. Both columns show that 
the average impact of receiving information on the score of the school chosen is significantly 
increasing in the average test score of schools within five miles, implying that simplified 
information will have the largest impact on observed choices where the cost of choosing higher-
scoring schools is lowest. These results are similar to the results found using the 2004 NCLB 
natural experiment and emphasize that, while simplified information may have a large impact on 
the implicit weight parents place on academics, this impact will only be expressed through 
changes in observable choice behavior for families whose costs of choosing good schools, once 
they can identify them, are relatively low.
25   
 
Among the interactions with demographics, we again find that parents of children with no other 
identifiable siblings in CMS were more likely to respond to information by changing their choice 
behavior. This may be because these families face fewer transportation constraints that may 
inhibit them from sending a child to a non-guaranteed school or a school that is further away.
26 
We also find that African American parents are more likely to respond to transparent information 
by choosing higher-scoring schools. The opposite was true in the 2004 NCLB natural 
experiment, where African Americans and free-lunch recipients who selected alternative schools 
in response to NCLB information chose slightly lower-scoring schools than other responders. 
There is much more variation in socio-economic status in this sample than in the 2004 NCLB 
natural experiment, which may generate the difference in results.  
 
Taken together, the results from the 2004 NCLB natural experiment and the field experiment we 
conducted in 2006 imply that receiving transparent information on school academic achievement 
has a significant impact on parental choice. It increased demand for non-guaranteed schools, as 
                                                 
25 Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007) estimate the impact that simplified information had on the implicit 
weight placed on academics in a random-utility model of school choice. They find that information doubled the 
importance placed on test scores, a change in expressed preferences equivalent to that of a $65,000 increase in 
family income. Using these preference estimates, they simulate the change in demand for non-guaranteed schools if 
the entire sample were given simplified information. They find an 8 percentage point increase in demand, very 
similar to the reduced-form treatment effect identified in Table VI. The random utility model incorporates the 
characteristics of each family’s choice set, such as distance to each school and distance to the guaranteed school. 
Thus a very large impact on preferences for academics may only results in an 8 percentage point increase in 
demand, due to the fact that families still face other trade-offs, such as relative transportation costs, when choosing a 
school. Our measure of average distances and test scores of schools within five miles is a reduced-form way of 
capturing these trade-offs.  
26 All students in this setting are rising-grade students, so we cannot include an indicator for rising-grade students.   18
well as the test scores of the schools families chose. The fact that overall results were similar 
across the two experiments suggests that the degree of simplification is not as important as just 
providing information on school test scores to parents at the time of choice. Furthermore, across 
the two samples, families with high-scoring schools in close proximity are the most likely to 
choose better schools, as we would expect if parents face trade-offs between utility gains from 
academics versus proximity when choosing schools.  
 
V. Impact on Test Scores 
 
While simplified information on school test scores resulted in more parents choosing higher-
scoring schools, it is not clear if students benefit academically from attending those schools. A 
handful of recent papers have examined the impact of attending first-choice schools on academic 
outcomes using lottery assignments in school choice plans to generate random variation in the 
test score at the school attended.
27 Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) examine lottery outcomes for 
high school choice in the Chicago Public Schools, and Cullen and Jacob (2007) examine similar 
lotteries for elementary school students. Neither finds a significant impact of attending a first-
choice school on test scores. This may be in part caused by the fact that, on average, attending a 
first-choice school results in only small increases in the test score of the school attended (0.019 
percentile points or about 0.1 student-level standard deviations).
28 It also may be the case that 
parents are picking particular schools for different reasons, leading to heterogeneous treatment 
effects that average towards zero. Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2007) use lottery assignments 
from the first round of school choice in CMS (Spring 2002) and find that parents pick schools for 
different reasons and that students of parents who place high implicit weights on academic 
achievement experience significant gains in test scores as a result of attending their first-choice 
school. 
 
                                                 
27 Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) examine a voucher program in Colombia that provided one half of 
secondary school tuition by lottery to low-income high school students. Continuation of the voucher after the first 
year was predicated on sufficient academic progress. They find significant impacts of winning a voucher lottery on 
graduation rates and other measures of academic performance.   
28 Cullen, Jacob and Levitt (2006) also examine subgroup impacts for students who picked high-performing schools. 
In that subgroup, winning a lottery increased the score of the school attended by 0.043 percentile points or about 
0.18 student-level standard deviations. They do not find significant subgroup impacts on scores.   19
The two experiments in this paper provide an opportunity to examine the impact of attending 
higher-scoring schools on own academic achievement for parents who were much more directed 
in choosing schools based on academic dimensions, as a result of receiving transparent 
information on test scores.
29 The experiments have two slightly different designs, so we will 
analyze them separately. In the field experiment, we will focus on the non-NCLB students and 
instrument for the test score at the school attended with the random assignment of information 
and its interactions with baseline characteristics that lower the expected costs of responding to 
information by choosing a higher-scoring school. In the 2004 NCLB natural experiment, 
treatment and control groups were the same set of families before and after receiving NCLB-
mandated information, so we do not see eventual academic outcomes for both treatment and 
control groups, as we do in the field experiment. However, since students of parents who chose 
alternative schools were subjected to a lottery admission process, we can use the lottery 
assignments to generate random variation in the score of the school attended.  
 
2006 Field Experiment: The effect of attending a higher-scoring school on test score outcomes 
Table VIII presents estimates from instrumental variables regressions of the test score of the 
school attended on student academic performance for the 2006-2007 academic year. We present 
results using both school-zone aggregate data and student-level data. Each column presents 
regressions of the form:  
ε β θ + + = X S Y  (4) 
ν + Π = Z S  (5) 
where the dependent variable, Y, is a vector of test score outcomes, S is the endogenous average 
test score of the school attended in the 2006-2007 school year measured in student-level standard 
deviation units, X is a matrix of covariates that include randomization-block fixed effects as well 
as student-level baseline characteristics in specifications using student-level data. Equation (5) 
specifies the test score of the school attended as a function of the exogenous regressors. The 
excluded instrument is receiving information, and in specifications using student-level data, we 
will add as additional instruments interactions between receiving information and baseline 
                                                 
29 Using a random utility model, Hastings, Van Weelden, and Weinstein (2007) show that receiving information in 
the field experiment doubles parental preferences for test scores. Comparing mean preferences to those in Hastings, 
Kane, and Staiger (2007), we see that receiving information effectively turned low-preference-for-academics 
families into high-preference-for-academics families.    20
characteristics that decrease the cost of attending a higher-scoring alternative school. Because 
standardized testing begins in third grade, we do not have outcome measures for kindergarteners, 
so we drop them from the analysis. This leaves us with 3,280 students in 33 school-zones. 
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) results are reported for each specification. 
Standard errors are clustered at the school-program and grade attended for all specifications 
using student-level data. 
 
The successive columns of the table show how the point estimates change with aggregation and 
the set of instruments used. The first column uses data aggregated at the school-zone level to 
examine the impact of the school-zone averaged score of the school attended on school-zone 
averaged test score outcomes. We instrument for the averaged score of the school attended using 
an indicator for whether the school-zone block received information. Because only 36% of 
students who chose alternative schools were admitted, receiving information is a weak predictor 
of the score of the school attended.
30 The point estimate on the score of the school attended is 
0.336 but highly insignificant, with a standard error of 0.550. The p-value of the excluded 
instrument is only 0.09. The second column reports results for the same specification in column 
(1) but uses student-level data and adds baseline student-level controls for academic 
achievement, demographics, and choice-set characteristics. The instrument is still weak, with a 
p-value of 0.10. The point estimate on the test score of the school attended (0.183) is similar to 
that in column (1) but remains highly insignificant with a standard error of 0.398.  
 
The third column has the same specification as column 2 but adds additional instruments that 
measure how easily a parent could choose a high-scoring alternative school. In particular, we 
include the average test score of schools within five miles and an indicator for whether the child 
is a single child in CMS, both interacted with receiving information. This increases the p-value 
of the excluded instruments to 0.04, the point estimate increases to 0.355, but it is not quite 
significant at the 10% level. The fourth column of Table VIII adds in the average distance to 
                                                 
30 Once parents submitted their choice forms, admission to oversubscribed schools was granted based on a lottery 
process. Because of this lottery, only 36% of students were admitted to their first-choice school. Approximately the 
same fraction attended their chosen school. This comes both from students who won lotteries and attended their 
chosen school as well as students who were admitted off of waitlists into their chosen school over the summer as 
seats became available due to student mobility. Receiving information still increases the test score of the school 
attended versus the home school, but the effect is half of the magnitude for the score of the school chosen (0.05 
instead of 0.10).   21
schools within five miles and the distance to the guaranteed school, both interacted with 
receiving information, as further instruments to adjust for the degree to which a family might be 
relatively far or close to all of its school options. This increases the p-value of the excluded 
instruments to 0.01 and results in a significant point estimate for the score of the school attended 
of 0.409. This implies that increasing the score of the school attended by one student-level 
standard deviation results in an expected gain in own test score of about 0.4 student-level 
standard deviations. The estimated effect is large, but the standard errors are large as well, with 
95% confidence interval lower-bound of 0.017. 
  
2004 NCLB Natural Experiment: The effect of attending a higher-scoring school on test score 
outcomes 
The 2004 NCLB natural experiment provides a second opportunity to examine if there are 
academic gains for children of parents that chose substantially better schools in response to 
receiving transparent information on test scores. Because all families were treated with the 
NCLB-mandated information, we will use the summer 2004 random lottery admissions to 
chosen schools to create treatment and control groups. 
 
Once choice forms were submitted in July 2004, admissions were determined by lottery. The 
lottery was run based on the number of seats made available for each grade and school-choice 
combination. The lottery number was the concatenation of two priority numbers followed by a 
random number. Priority was given to students performing below grade level and to students 
who qualified for free or reduced lunch, in order to satisfy the NCLB requirement that the 
lowest-performing and poorest students be given the first right to attend an alternative school. 
We will use only the priority group (if any) in each grade and choice combination for which 
some students won and some students lost that lottery; that is, we include only students for 
whom lottery number alone determined admission. This leaves us with a very small sample of 
227 students, since many students were in priority groups for which everyone was either 
admitted or denied admission for that particular grade and choice.
31  
 
                                                 
31 For further discussion of the lottery process and the construction of this sample, see Hastings and Weinstein 
(2007).   22
Table IX presents regression results of the form: 
i i i i L w y ε δ θ α + + + =
'  (6) 
where wi is an indicator for whether student i won the lottery to attend her chosen school and Li 
is a vector of lottery fixed effects (Rouse 1998). The dependent variables are listed as rows in 
Table IX, and each cell reports the coefficient and standard error for θ. Standard errors are 
clustered at the attended school program and grade level. The results show that winning a lottery 
to attend a chosen school had no significant impact on student baseline characteristics; however, 
it did significantly increase the probability of attending a chosen school by 0.60 and the score of 
the school attended by 0.34 student-level standard deviations.
32  
 
Table X presents instrumental variables regressions of the form: 
i i i i i L X S y ε δ β θ α + + + + =
' '  (7) 
i i i i i i i L X w w S ν γ β λ φ μ + + + + + =
' ' s  (8) 
where yi is student i’s combined test score outcome in student-level standard deviations; Si is the 
average test score of the school attended in the 2004-2005 school year measured in student-level 
standard deviation units; and Xi is a vector of student baseline characteristics, including baseline 
test score, race, lunch status, and level effects for all included interactions. Li is a vector of 
lottery fixed effects. Excluded instruments are an indicator for whether the student won the 
lottery, wi, and its interaction with the test score of the chosen school relative to the guaranteed 
school, si. Standard errors are clustered at the school-program and grade attended. 
 
The first column of Table X shows a large but insignificant impact of the test score of school 
attended on own test score outcomes when we use only indicator if the student won the lottery to 
attend her chosen school as an instrument. Column 2 adds the interaction of winning the lottery 
with the difference between the scores of the chosen school and guaranteed school as an 
additional instrument, allowing the treatment effect to vary with the size of the treatment.
33 
When we add this instrument, the coefficient on the score of the school attended increases in size 
                                                 
32 In addition, the score of the school attended increases by about half the score of the school chosen, reflecting the 
fact that winning the lottery increases the probability of attending the chosen school by about 50%. 
33 Note that this is a valid instrument since we control for lottery fixed effects, and lottery number is randomly 
assigned within each school choice lottery.   23
and becomes marginally significant. The point estimate implies that attending a school with one 
student-level standard deviation higher test scores results in a 0.37 student-level standard 
deviation increase in own test scores. This result is similar in magnitude to the results from the 
2006-2007 information field experiment and is marginally significant despite the small sample 
size.  
 
Taken together, the results of these two experiments imply that providing clear information on 
school test scores within a choice plan increases the proportion of parents choosing higher-
scoring schools for their children. These changed choices appear to have generated measurable 
improvements in academic outcomes.
34 The impact on own test scores for attending a school 
with higher average test scores is similar to the heterogeneous treatment effect that Hastings, 
Kane, and Staiger (2007) find for students whose parents selected schools with a strong implied 
preference for academics (‘self-informed’ parents). In their study, the impact of winning the 
school choice lottery for families in upper quartile of the preference-for-test-score distribution 
was 0.082 student-level standard deviations, and winning the lottery resulted in them attending 
schools with 0.16 student-level standard deviation higher average test scores (a 0.51 impact).
35  
 
It is important to note that these results do not imply that moving a random low-achieving child 
to a school with high average test scores will result in academic gains for that child. This study 
identifies the impact of the test score of the school attended off of parents who respond to school 
choice with information on test scores, through choosing an alternative school with an emphasis 
on academic achievement.
36 Other recent studies have estimated the impact of moving a child to 
a school with higher average test scores using exogenous changes in school assignments 
generated by busing for integration programs (Hoxby and Weingarth-Salyer 2005; Hastings and 
Weinstein 2008). These studies find significant impacts of 0.16 – 0.25 student-level standard 
                                                 
34 In addition, average test score of the school attended is positively correlated with other school characteristics, such 
as attendance, safety, average peer income levels, and, potentially, teacher and staff quality. Thus, the impact on 
own academic outcome of moving from a low-performing school to a high-performing school should not be 
interpreted as the impact of test scores alone but rather of a potential bundle of school quality measures that are all 
correlated with higher average test scores. Future research may be able to determine the optimal type of information 
to provide to parents to increase test score outcomes.  
35 From author’s calculations using predicted test score gains from results in Table X, row 2 of Hastings, Kane, and 
Staiger (2007) for the upper quartile of the preference-for-test-scores in the sample used for the lottery analysis.  
36 The results from Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2007) can be seen as identifying the impact among families with 
high preferences for academics, that is, families who are informed and choose for academics on their own.   24
deviations on own test scores from attending a school with one student-level standard deviation 
higher average test score. This suggests that the impact of attending a higher-performing school 
is larger for students of parents who are informed and seeking academics, than it is for an 
average student. Letting parents self-select and providing information so that they can make fully 
informed choices may be an important benefit of school choice over student assignment for a 





The goal of a public school choice plan is to increase academic outcomes for disadvantaged 
students by allowing them to attend higher-performing schools and by creating pressure on 
failing schools to improve through the threat of losing students. This implicitly assumes that 
disadvantaged families are fully informed about school academic performance and choose 
higher-performing schools when offered the opportunity to do so. This paper used two 
experiments in a public school choice plan to show that information and decision making costs 
play important roles in parental choice among low-to-middle income families. Providing clear 
statistics on school test scores with parents’ choice forms resulted in significantly more parents 
choosing higher-scoring schools for their children. The impact of information on observed 
choice behavior was largest for families with higher-scoring schools in relatively close 
proximity, implying that school choice and information are most effective when parents have 
quality alternatives within a reasonable distance. Using the random variation in the test score of 
the school attended generated by each experiment, we find evidence that attending a higher-
scoring school results in significant gains to own test score outcomes.  
 
The results in this study suggest that simplified information on school academic achievement 
may have a significant impact on the efficacy of school choice plans for disadvantaged families. 
First, providing simplified information to families at relatively underperforming schools resulted 
in immediate academic gains from attending an alternative school. Second, because direct 
                                                 
37 Notice that this does not imply that measures of overall student achievement will necessarily be higher under 
school choice. To understand this, one would need a model of achievement for each student who does not select a 
higher-performing school, as well as a supply-side model of school closures and openings as a district responds to 
choice by offering different products in order to maximize student achievement.   25
information on school test scores increased the fraction of parents choosing higher-scoring 
alternatives, policies that incorporate simple and direct information on academics may increase 
pressure on under-performing schools to improve achievement through the threat of losing 
students. These results add to growing evidence that the provision and framing of information 
may be an important tool that policy makers can use when choice is introduced to increase 
efficiency in public goods markets (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2006; McFadden 2006; Winter 
et al. 2006; Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton 2008; Kling et al. 2008).  
 
The results also highlight the potential problems with incentives to provide information. In 
private markets with a standard rating, firms have the incentive to disclose ratings since high-
rated firms will gain an increase in demand and low-rated firms will self-reveal if they do not 
post their ratings.
38 In public schooling, high-quality providers may not have an incentive to 
voluntarily post their scores if they only attract uniformed parents whose children may be 
relatively more costly to educate than those of informed parents.
39 Thus in such settings, 
incentives for voluntary advertising and disclosure may break down, potentially requiring 
additional incentive structures or mandates for information provision, as was the case for NCLB. 
 
Yale University and National Bureau of Economic Research 
Yale University 
                                                 
38 Mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure yield the same outcome, as long as the information is costlessly 
verifiable. Discussions of this information unraveling principle can be found in Grossman (1981) and Milgrom 
(1981). 
39 For example, children of self-informed parents may be less costly to educate if those parents are more likely to 
participate and volunteer in school activities and education.  26 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics for Students in 2004 NCLB Natural Experiment and 2006 Field Experiment 
 
 





















  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
African Amercian
3  0.428  0.840 0.429 0.570  0.665 
  (0.495)  (0.366) (0.495) (0.495)  (0.472) 
         
Lunch recipient
4  0.421  0.863 0.461 0.608  0.837 
  (0.494)  (0.343) (0.498) (0.488)  (0.369) 
         
Student’s combined test score
5  0.003  -0.568 0.006 -0.339  -0.518 
  (0.946)  (0.772) (0.948) (0.850)  (0.827) 
         
Income
6  56,271  32,058 56,764 48,767  35,194 
  (27,346)  (13,253) (26,915) (21,278)  (14,943) 
         
Number of unexcused absences
7  3.933  5.663 4.116 3.449  4.387 
  (7.070)  (6.717) (7.152) (6.004)  (6.002) 
         
Number of suspensions
8  1.180  2.281 1.126 1.500  1.809 
  (4.440)  (6.485) (4.489) (5.550)  (5.882) 
         
Number of students  115,716  6,695  125,313  6,328  10,134 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
1In columns (1) and (3), we exclude 2,071 and 141 students, respectively, with missing address data. 
2There were 8,284 students who received NCLB-mandated information in 2004. We began with the 8,284 students who received NCLB-mandated 
information. We exclude inactive students (221), special needs students and retentions (1,245), and students with missing demographics (123).  
3Indicates whether student’s race is coded as African American in the administrative dataset. 
4Indicates whether student received free- or reduced-
lunch subsidies according to administrative data. 
5Average of test score in reading and math for North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by 
the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. Since only students in grades three through eight take exams, samples sizes are 
50,182; 4,646; 62,759; 3,920; and 6,117, respectively, in columns (1) through (5). 
6Based on student residential locations, we computed each 
student’s income as the median income in the 2000 Census for people of a student’s own race living in a student’s block group. 
7Computed from end 
of year tabulations of absences in the administrative database. Sample sizes for absences and suspensions are 115,699; 6,695; 125,285; 6,322; and 
10,132, respectively, in columns (1) through (5), since not all students remain through the end of the year. 
8Computed from end of year tabulations of 















  (1) (2) (3) 
All parents of NCLB students
3     
Fraction choosing school and program other than 







      
Test score of first-choice school and program 








     
Number of students  6,695  6,695  6,695 
      
Parents who chose NCLB school and program first in Spring 2004 choice round
5  
Fraction choosing school and program other than 







      
Test score of first-choice school and program 







      
Number of students  5,946  5,946  5,946 
Notes: 
1Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
2Standard errors from a t-test of the equality of Spring 2004 and July 2004 means are in 
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 
3We began with the 8,284 students who received NCLB-mandated 
information. We exclude inactive students (221), special needs students and retentions (1,245), and students with missing demographics 
(123). 
4School and program test scores are school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North 
Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. 
5Sample excludes parents 















  (1) (2)  (3) 
Test score at first-choice school and program
3      
Spring 2004 choice round  -0.502  -0.513  -0.421 
July 2004 NCLB choice round  -0.017  -0.034  0.108 
      
Average test score of schools and programs within five miles
4     
Spring 2004 choice round  -0.322  -0.328  -0.277 
July 2004 NCLB choice round  -0.247  -0.253  -0.206 
      
Number of students  1,092  963  129 
Notes: 
1This sub-sample includes students whose parents’ first choice in July 2004 was a school and program other than their NCLB 
school and program. 
2Sub-sample of students whose race is coded as African American in the administrative dataset. 
3School and 
program test scores are school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End 
of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. 
4We computed the driving 
distance (in miles) from each student’s residence to each school that the student could choose. This variable is the average test score 
defined in footnote 4 for all schools within five miles. For the five students in the spring and the fifteen students in July with no schools 




Characteristics that Influenced Response to NCLB-Mandated Information 
Variable 
Dependent variable: 
Chose non-NCLB school and 
program first in July 2004 
Dependent variable: 
Average test score at first-choice school 







Choice set characteristics       
Distance to NCLB school
6  0.003 0.004  -0.015***  -0.016*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Average distance to schools within five miles
7  0.002 -0.007 -0.011  -0.004 
 (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
Average test score of schools within five miles
8 0.091***  0.110**  0.233***  0.186*** 
 (0.033)  (0.041)  (0.057)  (0.062) 
        
Student characteristics       
Single child in CMS
9 0.032***  0.024**  -0.006  -0.002 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.023) 
Rising grader
10 0.033***  0.035***  -0.052*  -0.039 
 (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.028)  (0.030) 
African American
11  0.051*** 0.062*** -0.079***  -0.081** 
 (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.028)  (0.036) 
Lunch recipient
12  0.022 0.029**  -0.070**  -0.082** 
 (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.032)  (0.037) 
Female
13  -0.004 -0.007  -0.027  -0.025 
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Demeaned income
14 -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Baseline number of unexcused absences
15  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.003  -0.004* 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Baseline number of suspensions
16 0.002**  0.003***  0.001  0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Baseline test score
17  0.016** 0.014*  0.025  0.032* 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.018) 
Chose non-NCLB school and program first in spring
  0.133*** -- 0.104***  -- 
 (0.024)  --  (0.023)  -- 
        
Constant 0.092**  0.108**  0.316***  0.300*** 
 (0.038)  (0.043)  (0.068)  (0.073) 
        
Mean of dependent variable  0.176  0.155  0.618  0.608 
Number of students  4,646  4,022  818  623 
Adjusted R-squared  0.04  0.03  0.14  0.14 
Notes: OLS estimation with NCLB school-program fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the level of the NCLB school–program and grade 
level. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 
1School and program test scores are school and program means of student-level average 
test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade 
level.
 2Sample includes students in grades three through eight who took the North Carolina End of Grade exam. 
3Sample includes all students in column 
(1) who did not choose NCLB school and program first in the spring. 
4Sample includes all students in column (1) who did not choose NCLB school and 
program first in July. 
5Sample includes all students in column (2) who did not choose NCLB school and program first in either choice round. 
6Driving 
distance (in miles) from each student’s residence to her NCLB school. 
7We computed the driving distance (in miles) from each student’s residence to each 
school that the student could choose. We then calculated the mean distance for all schools and programs within five miles of the student’s residence. For 
the 76, 67, 15, and 11 students in columns (1) through (4), respectively, with no schools within five miles, we used the driving distance to the closest 
school. 
8We computed the driving distance (in miles) from each student’s residence to each school that the student could choose. We then calculated the 
mean test score for all schools and programs within five miles of the student’s residence (see footnote 1). For the 76, 67, 15, and 11 students in columns 
(1) through (4), respectively, with no schools within five miles, we used the average test score of schools and programs within ten miles. 
9Indicates 
whether student does not have a sibling in CMS. 
10Indicates whether student is entering kindergarten or sixth grade in the fall. 
11Indicates whether 
student’s race is coded as African American in the administrative dataset. 
12Indicates whether student received free- or reduced-lunch subsidies according 
to administrative data. 
13Indicates whether student is female according to administrative data. 
14Based on student residential locations, we computed each 
student’s income as the median income in the 2000 Census for people of a student’s own race living in a student’s block group. Demeaned income is 
obtained by subtracting the countywide average income of $51,000 and dividing by 1,000. 
15Computed from end of year tabulations of absences in the 
administrative database. 
16Computed from end of year tabulations of in-school and out-of-school suspensions in the administrative database. 
17Average of 
the test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each 
grade level. 32 
 
Table V 
Averaged Baseline Characteristics: Treatment and Control Groups, 2006 Field Experiment
 
School-zone averaged variable 




















Fraction African American students
2  0.641 0.548 0.620 0.0006 -0.044 
  (0.162) (0.186) (0.215)  (0.042)  (0.064) 
      [0.989]  [0.494] 
         
Fraction lunch recipients
3  0.763 0.748 0.716  0.046  0.029 
  (0.128) (0.144) (0.229)  (0.038)  (0.059) 
      [0.237]  [0.625] 
         
Average income
4  41725 41573 43334  -1811  -2417 
 (8996)  (8456)  (13598)  (2289)  (3504) 
      [0.432]  [0.493] 
         
Average test score
5  -0.404 -0.452 -0.426  0.019  -0.123 
  (0.248) (0.191) (0.281)  (0.059)  (0.081) 
      [0.751]  [0.136] 
         
Average number of unexcused absences
6  3.932 4.139 4.220 -0.515 0.406 
  (1.994) (2.192) (2.673)  (0.460)  (0.704) 
      [0.267]  [0.566] 
         
Average number of suspensions
7  1.922 1.569 1.912 -0.100 -0.624 
  (2.652) (2.483) (2.602)  (0.530)  (0.811) 
      [0.850]  [0.444] 
         
Number of school-zones  33  11  33  77  77 
Notes: 
1All regressions include randomization-block fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses, and p-values are in brackets. 
Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). 
2School-zone fraction of students whose race is coded as African 
American in the administrative dataset. 
3School-zone fraction of students received free- or reduced-lunch subsidies according to 
administrative data. 
4Based on student residential locations, we computed each student’s income as the median income in the 2000 
Census for people of a student’s own race living in a student’s block group. 
5School-zone average of the student mean test score in 
reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for 
each grade level. Since only students in grades three through eight take North Carolina End of Grade exams, the samples sizes for 
this variable are 28 school-zones that received Score forms, 11 school-zones that received Odds forms, and 25 school-zones that 
were in the control group. 
6School-zone average of student end of year tabulations of absences in the administrative database. 




 Impact of Receiving Information on Aggregate Parental Choice in 2006 Field Experiment 
  Ordinary Least Squares
1  Weighted Least Squares
2 





Average difference in 
test score between first-








Average difference in 




Panel 1: Sample includes all school-zones
    
Regression with scores and odds separately     
Scores  0.026 0.039 0.007 0.013 
  (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
Odds  0.008 0.055  0.0003  0.023 
  (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) 
Regression with scores and odds pooled     
Received information 0.021  0.043 0.006 0.016 
 (0.026)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
      
Mean of dependent variable  0.258  0.136 0.237 0.142 
Number of school-zones
  77  77  77 77 
      
Panel 2: Sample includes  non-NCLB school-zones only    
Regression with scores and odds separately      
Scores 0.066*  0.097***  0.073*  0.101*** 
  (0.036) (0.029) (0.036) (0.027) 
Odds 0.045  0.107**  0.079  0.104** 
  (0.057) (0.046) (0.060) (0.043) 
Regression with scores and odds pooled      
Received information  0.061*  0.100*** 0.075** 0.101*** 
  (0.032) (0.026) (0.032) (0.023) 
      
Mean of dependent variable  0.319  0.142  0.305  0.136 
Number of school-zones
  46 46 46 46 
      
Panel 3: Sample includes NCLB school-zones only     
Regression with scores and odds separately     
Scores  -0.027 -0.037 -0.026 -0.030 
  (0.044) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) 
Odds  -0.044 -0.020 -0.039 -0.020 
  (0.065) (0.062) (0.054) (0.055) 
Regression with scores and odds pooled     
Received information  -0.031 -0.033 -0.029 -0.027 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) 
      
Mean of dependent variable  0.168 0.128 0.195 0.146 
Number of school-zones
  31  31 31 31 
Notes: All regressions include randomization-block fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, 
***=.01).
1Each column presents separate OLS regressions of aggregated choice behavior on indicators for whether the school-zone received a Score 
form or an Odds form (Scores and Odds Separately) or an indicator for whether the school-zone received any type of information (Scores and Odds 
pooled), controlling for randomization-block fixed effects. 
2Weight by the number of students in each school-zone. 
3A guaranteed option is the school 
and program in which the student was currently enrolled, or, in the case of rising-grade students, her home school. 
4School and program test scores 
computed by taking school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, 
standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. For high school choices, we used the results of the English I End of 
Course exam, taken by most ninth grade students. 34 
 
Table VII 
 Impact of Information on Student-Level Choice Behavior:  
Non-NCLB Sample in 2006 Field Experiment
 
Dependent variable: 








  (1) (2) 
Main effect    
Received information
2  0.017 0.189 
  (0.047) (0.141) 
Interactions with choice-set characteristics    
Information * Distance to guaranteed option
3  -0.015* -0.045*** 
  (0.008) (0.015) 
Information * Average distance to schools within five miles
4  0.015 0.026 
  (0.010) (0.018) 
Information * Average test score of schools within five miles
5  0.109* 0.243* 
  (0.060) (0.122) 
Information * Test score at guaranteed option
  0.030 -0.052 
  (0.070) (0.126) 
Interactions with demographics    
Information * Single child in CMS
6  0.026* 0.014 
  (0.016) (0.038) 
Information * African American
  0.060** 0.018 
  (0.022) (0.075) 
Information * Lunch recipient
  0.035 0.040 
  (0.038) (0.071) 
Interactions with baseline academic performance    
Information * Test score
7  0.014 0.011 
  (0.022) (0.029) 
Information * Number of absences
8  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.006) 
Information * Number of suspensions
9  -0.001 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.004) 
    
Number of students  3,920  1,222 
Adjusted R-squared  0.17  0.33 
    
Joint P-value for information and interactions   0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). First column includes students in grades three through eight who took the North 
Carolina End of Grade exam in the spring of 2006. Second column includes all students in column (1) who chose their non-guaranteed option 
first. Each column includes controls for level effects (distance to guaranteed option, average distance to schools within five miles, average test 
score of schools within five miles, test score at guaranteed option, indicator if student is a single child in CMS, an indicator if the student is 
African American, indicator if the student receives lunch subsidies, student’s baseline combined test score, baseline number of absences, baseline 
number of out-of-school suspensions, an indicator if the student was in a magnet program) as well as randomization-block fixed effects. All 
school and program test scores are school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End 
of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. For high school choices, we used the results 
of the English I End of Course exam, taken by most ninth grade students. 
1A guaranteed option is the school and program the student was 
currently enrolled, or, in the case of rising-grade students, her home school. 
2Indicates whether student received a Score or Odds form. 
3Driving 
distance (in miles) from each student’s residence to her guaranteed option. 
4We computed the driving distance (in miles) from each student’s 
residence to each school that the student could choose. We then calculated the mean distance for all schools and programs within five miles of the 
student’s residence. For the 179 to 473 students with no schools within five miles, we used the driving distance to the closest school. 
5Average 
test score for all schools and programs within five miles of the student’s residence (see footnote 4). For the 179 to 473 students with no schools 
within five miles, we used the average test score of the closest school and program. 
6A student is a single child in CMS if there are no other 
students in CMS with the same last name and address. 
7Average of the test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, 
standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. 
8Computed from end of year tabulations of absences in the 
administrative database. 
9Computed from end of year tabulations of out-of-school suspensions in the administrative database.
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Table VIII 
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Effect of Test Score at School Attended  
on Own Test Score: Non-NCLB Students in 2006 Field Experiment
 
Dependent variable: 
Mean of reading and math test score in 
2007
  Model 1
  Model 2
  Model 3
  Model 4
 











        
Number of observations  33  3,280  3,280  3,280 
R-squared
  0.62 0.70  0.69  0.69 
        
Excluded instruments for test score of 























(a) Received information 
(b) Info * Single child 
(c) Info * Average test score 





(a) Received information 
(b) Info * Single child 
(c) Info * Average test score 
of schools within five miles 
(d) Info * Average distance to 
schools within five miles 
(e) Info * Distance to 
guaranteed school 
       
Joint P-value for excluded instruments  0.092  0.100  0.038  0.007 
Notes: Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). Column 1 presents LIML results for school-zone averaged test score of school attended on 
school-zoned averaged test score outcomes. There were 33 non-NCLB school-zones in the experiment where students were old enough to take 
standardized exams. The instrument for school-averaged score of school attended is an indicator if the school zone received Scores or Odds forms. 
Regression controls for randomization-block fixed-effects. Columns 2-4 present LIML results using student-level data. Coefficient reported is the impact 
of the test score at the attended school and program on own combined test score. Each regression controls for randomization block fixed effects and the 
following baseline covariates: indicator if the student is a single child in CMS, average test score of schools within five miles, average distance to schools 
within five miles, driving distance from each student’s residence to her guaranteed option, an indicator if the student is African American, an indicator if 
the student receives lunch subsidies, average of the standardized test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, number of 
absences, number of out-of-school suspensions, and an indicator for whether the student had at least one out-of-school suspension. The instruments for test 
score of the school attended are listed in each column. School and program test scores computed by taking school and program means of student-level 
average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each 
grade level. For high school choices, we used the results of the English I End of Course exam, taken by most ninth grade students. Own test score is 
average of the standardized test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams taken in Spring 2007, or for ninth grade students, 
standardized test score on English I End of Course exam. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the attended school-program and grade 
level in the 2006-2007 school year. 36 
 
Table IX 
Characteristics of 2004 NCLB Lottery Winners and Lottery Losers
 
Variable  Coefficient on won lottery
 
Baseline characteristic   
African American
1  0.057 
(0.052) 
   
Lunch recipient
2  -0.018 
(0.013) 
   
Female
3  -0.001 
(0.068) 
   
Income
4  2,024 
(1,793) 
   
Number of unexcused absences
5  -1.787 
(1.207) 
   
Number of suspensions
6  0.704 
(1.044) 
   
Test score
7  -0.051 
(0.056) 
School characteristics   
Attended chosen school
8  0.602*** 
  (0.075) 
   




   
Number of students  223 
Notes: Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). We restrict our sample to only students for whom lottery number alone determined 
admission. Of the 1,092 students who submitted a choice form in July 2004, 227 students fall into such priority groups. Four students left CMS before Fall 
2004. Each row reports the coefficient on an indicator for whether the student won the lottery from separate regressions with dependent variable given by 
the row title. Each regression controls for lottery fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the level of the 2004-2005 school year attended 
school-program and grade. 
1Indicates whether student’s race is coded as African American in the administrative dataset. 
2Indicates whether student 
received free- or reduced-lunch subsidies according to administrative data. 
3Indicates whether student is female according to administrative data. 
4Based 
on student residential locations, we computed each student’s income as the median income in the 2000 Census for people of a student’s own race living in 
a student’s block group. 
5Computed from end of year tabulations of absences in the administrative database. 
6Computed from end of year tabulations of 
in-school and out-of-school suspensions in the administrative database. 
7Average of the test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of 
Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. Because only students in grades three through eight take 
End of Grade exams, the sample size for this regression is 178. 
8Indicates whether student attended her chosen school in 2004-2005 school year. 
9School 
and program test scores computed by taking school and program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina 
End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level.   37
 
Table X 
Instrumental Variables Estimates of Effect of Test Score of School Attended on Own Test Score for 
Students in 2004 NCLB Lottery 
Dependent variable: 
Mean of reading and math test score in 2005
  Model 1
  Model 2
 
Test score of attended school and program
  0.172 0.372* 
 (0.299)  (0.206) 
    
Number of observations  161  161 
R-squared
  0.69 0.67 
    








(a) Won lottery 
(b) Won lottery * (Test score at chosen school 
and program  - Test score at NCLB school and 
program) 
    
Joint P-Value for Excluded Instruments  0.0016  0.0019 
Notes: Asterisks indicate significance (*=.10, **=.05, ***=.01). We restrict our sample to only students for whom lottery number alone 
determined admission. Of the 1,092 students who submitted a choice form in July 2004, 227 students fall into such priority groups. Four students 
left CMS before Fall 2004. Of the 227 students, 161 took North Carolina End of Grade exams in math and reading in both Spring 2004 and 
Spring 2005 (only students in grades three through eight take exams in each year). School and program test scores computed by taking school and 
program means of student-level average test scores in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, standardized by the district-
wide mean and standard deviation for each grade level. Own test score is average of the standardized test score in reading and math for the North 
Carolina End of Grade exams taken in spring 2005. Each column reports the coefficient from an instrumental variables regression of own 
outcome test score on the test score of the attended school and program, controlling for lottery-block (grade and choice; see footnote 1) fixed 
effects and the following baseline covariates: an indicator if the student is African American, an indicator if the student receives lunch subsidies, 
an indicator for female, average of the student’s baseline standardized test score in reading and math for the North Carolina End of Grade exams, 
number of absences, an indicator for five or more absences, number of in-school and out-of-school suspensions, and an indicator if the student 
had at least one suspension, income (based on student residential locations, we computed each student’s income as the median income in the 2000 
Census for people of a student’s own race living in a student’s block group), and the difference in test score between the chosen school and 
program and the NCLB school and program. The excluded instrument(s) for the test score of the attended school and program are listed in each 
column. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the attended school-program and grade level in the 2004-2005 school year.  
 














                    













Timeline of Events and Information Regimes
Parents of children at NCLB-sanctioned schools receive NCLB-mandated  
3-page spreadsheet of test scores at all schools in district.  
No direct information on test scores provided to parents 
1
st year  
choice forms 
submitted. 
Title 1 Improving 
schools identified, 
July 2004 NCLB 
choice occurs 
June 2005: test 
scores after 1
st year 
of NCLB lottery 
assignments 
2










provided with choice 
forms to students at 
selected NCLB and 
non-NCLB schools 
4




th year  
choice forms 
submitted.
June 2007: test scores 
after 1
st year of school 
assignments for 2006-
2007 school choice 
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Note: We use the Epanechnikov kernel and the optimal width as computed by default in Stata. 
 
Figure II 
Kernel Density Estimate of Difference in Test Score Between July First-Choice School and 
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Note: We use the Epanechnikov kernel and the optimal width as computed by default in Stata. 
 
Figure V 
Kernel Density Estimate of Difference in Test Score Between First-Choice School and 
Guaranteed School for Parents Who Chose Out, 2006 Field Experiment 